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RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 7606
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 3379
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 6861
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2598
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 8812
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 2494
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 4575
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5969
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1222
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2875
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1948
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 9988
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 1072
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 5411
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2024
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5810
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0137
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 8088
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 6300
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3474
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 5322
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 7042
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 6857
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 9276
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 4824
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 0827
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 3802
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RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 7469
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 3442
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 6453
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RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1851
RUEHWD/AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 7184
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 9520
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4949
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 016169

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [XA](#) [AU](#) [LY](#)
SUBJECT: ENGAGING WITH LIBYA ON AFRICAN UNION ISSUES

REF: A. TRIPOLI 134
[1](#)B. ADDIS 384
[1](#)C. STATE 12900

Classified By: NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (U) Action requested - please see paragraph 5.

[1](#)2. (C) The Department read with great interest ref A on obstacles to success and opportunities for engagement with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in the wake of his election as Chair of the African Union (AU) . While some African heads of state may view Qadhafi,s AU chairmanship as a "lost

year," we recognize that some of Qadhafi's more inflammatory rhetoric belies a fair amount of common interest and cooperation with the United States, and there are areas where we can work with Libya to advance U.S. interests towards and engagement with the AU.

13. (C) Libya played a positive role in facilitating the November 2008 exchange of ambassadors between Chad and Sudan and could further encourage the two countries to end support for one another's rebels. Regarding Somalia, a sustainable resolution of that country's governance and development challenges - including piracy - requires the broadest possible engagement by Somalis of all clans and political persuasions. Libya has supported a number of Somalia-related UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as the Djibouti Peace Process. On Zimbabwe, the AU must follow through on its commitment to monitor the implementation of the power-sharing agreement, and carefully scrutinize the actions of Mugabe and his allies. Key benchmarks should include: the immediate release of all political prisoners, cessation of political violence and human rights abuses, replacement of Central Bank Governor Gideon Gono with a technocrat, and a roadmap to national elections. Finally, the U.S. seeks to build up Africans' ability to provide continental peace and security. It would be helpful, in this context, to remind Qadhafi the U.S. Africa Command is a significant part of that goal and to note our appreciation of Libya's openness to

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engagement with the command.

14. (C) We envision at least two Assistant Secretary level bilateral meetings to discuss African Union issues in the coming year: possibly one in April, which would give enough time to make changes in the run-up to the June/July 2009 AU Summit, and another in October, prior to the January/February 2010 AU Summit.

15. (SBU) Post is requested to seek reaction from Qadhafi and other appropriate interlocutors on the following points.

AFRICAN UNION

Extend congratulations on Qadhafi's election as Chairman of the African Union, and note that we look forward to working together with him on areas of common interest and to sort out differences of opinion.

Offer to engage in bilateral consultations - and with the African Union Commission - at both the AF A/S and working level, perhaps in April, which would give enough time to factor the results of the consultations into the next summit in June/July.

SUDAN

Note we share Libya's interest in improving the security of the region and agree on the need to address the Darfur conflict from a regional point of view.

Urge Libya to play a helpful role in the Darfur political process, including by supporting the efforts of UN/AU chief mediator Djibril Bassole, and refraining from undertaking parallel efforts that may have the effect of undermining or conflicting with the discussions underway in Doha, Qatar.

(as necessary) Urge Libya to encourage the Government of Sudan to both cooperate with UNAMID and exercise restraint in responding to a possible ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir. Note: see ref C for further background/detail. End note.

SUDAN/CHAD

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Note a long-lasting solution to the Darfur and Chad crises requires the cessation of all support by each government to the others, rebels.

Recognizing Libya's positive role in facilitating the November 2008 exchange of ambassadors between Chad and Sudan, and its integral role in previous Contact Group meetings, ask Libya to encourage Chad and Sudan to end rebel support and consider both a Heads of State summit among Chad, Sudan, and Libya, as well as a Contact Group meeting in the near term.

Ask Qadhafi how the USG and the rest of the international community can be of assistance.

SOMALIA

Note Libya and the United States agree a sustainable resolution of Somalia's governance and development challenges, including piracy, requires the broadest possible engagement by Somalis of all clans and political persuasions. Solutions imposed by outsiders are likely to be temporary at best and delay genuine progress.

Explain that our efforts have been devoted to ensuring the broad spectrum of clan and political interests represented in the Djibouti process by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) have the time, political space and security environment required to reach a political accommodation. Current signs are promising: Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected President on January 31 and will likely select a prime minister and cabinet in the coming days.

Urge Qadhafi to encourage Djibouti process participants to form the unity government and facilitate sufficient security on the ground in Mogadishu to ensure that it expands its authority. With this in mind, note we are working to assist the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and provide support for Somali security forces.

Thank Libya for its past support of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851 on Somalia piracy, and for its support of the Djibouti process and express our desire to continue our cooperative efforts on the Council and other fora.

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Note that piracy is impacting African states negatively in a number of ways including by increasing the costs of goods imported into and exported by sea from coastal and inland states, putting humanitarian food and other shipments to Somalia and Ethiopia at risk, disrupting intra-African coastal trade and shipping, and diverting cruise ships and some cargo carriers away from Kenya and Tanzania.

ZIMBABWE

Explain the critical importance of having the AU and SADC follow through on their commitment, as guarantors of the power-sharing agreement, to monitor the progress, or lack thereof, of the unity government.

It is important for both the AU and SADC to scrutinize Mugabe's actions and press him to share power in good faith, . Key benchmarks the United States and the international community will be watching include: the immediate release of all political prisoners, cessation of political violence and human rights abuses, replacement of Central Bank Governor Gideon Gono with a technocrat, and a roadmap to national elections. The people of Zimbabwe urgently need an inclusive and effective government to begin the reconstruction of Zimbabwe.

PEACE AND SECURITY

Note the United States robustly supports the enhancement of Africa's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and most significantly, the Africa Standby Force.

Explain that the continent's APSA must be supported at all three levels to be successful: continental (AU), sub-regional (RECs), and in the member states. USG programs therefore provide technical, material, and training support at all three levels to enhance the ability of Africans to manage conflict, respond to crises, and deal with other threats to stability such as illicit trafficking in arms or drugs and terrorism.

Solicit Qadhafi's help in urging Africans to increase their

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ability to deploy even more peacekeepers, especially police units, and for the African leadership to step up to the challenges in its maritime domain, including regarding illegal fishing, piracy, and illicit trafficking.

The African Union and sub-regional organizations should lead an effort to strengthen legal frameworks, enhance interagency cooperation at the regional and national levels, and improve African surveillance and response capacity.

AFRICOM

Explain that the United States Africa Command is focused on conflict prevention and works with African partner militaries to support defense reform and to help strengthen regional security and crisis response capacities, especially in the areas of peacekeeping, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.

Note we expect Africa Command will make substantial contributions to U.S. efforts to support the development of the African Standby Force.

The formation of the command reflects an internal reorganization designed to improve the coordination of U.S. military programs in Africa by bringing programs previously implemented by three separate commands under the administration of a single command.

Programs in Egypt will continue to be implemented by U.S. Central Command; Africa Command will coordinate with Central Command and the Government of Egypt on Africa-wide security issues.

16. (U) The Department thanks Embassy Tripoli for its past support in promoting USG views on African issues and looks forward to our continued work during Qadhafi's tenure as AU Chairman. If there are any questions, please contact AF/RSA Deputy Director Peter Henry Barlerin.

17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
CLINTON